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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT  
                       
_____________ 
 
No. 16-1660 
_____________ 
 
JANICE HAAGENSEN,  
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE 
ESTATE OF MYRTLE SHELBURNE HAAGENSEN, 
                                                                                         Appellant 
 
v. 
 
BETTY MAY REED; EDWARD ABERSOLD; 
ANNIE AND RUFUS K. HERSHBERGER; 
RICHARD RAPONE, TAX COLLECTOR OF LAWRENCE COUNTY; 
J.R HARDESTER, DIRECTOR OF ASSESMENTS OF LAWRENCE COUNTY;  
KAREN MAGNONE, PROPERTY TAX COLLECTOR OF  
NORTH BEAVER TOWNSHIP,  
IN AN INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY 
 
 
*Caption Amended Per Clerk’s Order of 04/14/2016  
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
District Court No. 2-14-cv-00495 
District Judge: The Honorable Arthur J. Schwab 
                               
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 9, 2016 
 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 
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(Filed: November 15, 2016)                              
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION1 
_____________________        
 
SMITH, Chief Judge.  
 
 In 2006, Janice Haagensen, as personal representative of her mother’s estate, 
initiated a quiet title action in the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County, 
Pennsylvania.  The state court ruled against her in March 2011, concluding that she 
failed to establish a “right to immediate exclusive possession” as required to 
succeed in her quiet title action.  Her untimely appeal to the Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court was unsuccessful.  In December 2011, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court denied her petition for allowance of appeal.   
 In 2014, Haagensen turned to the federal courts and filed this pro se civil 
rights action against the neighbor defendants in her state court quiet title action, the 
state court trial judge who presided over that action, and the tax assessment office 
and tax collector (tax entities).  A district judge in the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissed her action.  He concluded that 
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine2 barred her action against the neighbor defendants 
                                         
1 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 
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and the state court judge, and that the statute of limitations barred the claims 
against the tax entities.  Haagensen sought reconsideration, which the District 
Court denied.  Within days, the neighbor defendants moved for sanctions pursuant 
to the court’s inherent power to levy sanctions, claiming that Haagensen initiated 
this action to “harass her neighbors.”  See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 
U.S. 752, 765-66 (1980) (acknowledging that a court may impose sanctions 
pursuant to its inherent power when a losing party has acted, inter alia, vexatiously 
or for oppressive reasons) (citation omitted).  Immediately thereafter, Haagensen 
filed a notice of appeal.  Acknowledging that appeal, the District Court entered a 
text-only entry on the docket stating: “In light of the appeal filed by Plaintiff, said 
Motions for Sanctions . . . are dismissed without prejudice pending the resolution 
of the appeal.”   
 We affirmed the dismissal of Haagensen’s claims in their entirety.  
Haagensen v. Wherry, 610 F. App’x 210 (3d Cir. 2015).  Relevant to the appeal we 
now consider, we agreed that Rooker-Feldman barred the claims against the 
neighbor defendants.  After our mandate issued, Haagensen filed a petition for a 
writ of certiorari.  Following the Supreme Court’s denial of that request, the case 
returned to the District Court.  The neighbor defendants filed their second motion 
for sanctions asking the court to exercise its inherent power.  Haagensen opposed 
the motion, contending only that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to consider 
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that motion.  The Court disagreed and awarded monetary sanctions in the amount 
of $4,298.40 in attorney’s fees and costs.  The Court declined, though, to enjoin 
Haagensen from filing any further pro se pleadings.  Haagensen next filed a timely 
motion for reconsideration, which the District Court denied. 
 This timely appeal followed.  Haagensen does not take issue with the 
amount of the attorney’s fees or the propriety of the sanctions being imposed 
pursuant to the inherent power of the court.  Rather, she contends that the District 
Court’s dismissal under Rooker-Feldman for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as 
well as our affirmance, deprives the District Court of authority to do anything 
further in the case.3  Despite Haagensen’s prolix brief in support of her argument, 
we are not persuaded. 
 The District Court had federal question jurisdiction over Haagensen’s civil 
rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the neighbor defendants, the state 
court judge and the tax entities.  28 U.S.C. § 1331.  Thereafter, the neighbor 
defendants raised the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in their motion to dismiss.  That 
doctrine bars the District Court from reviewing and rejecting an unfavorable state 
                                         
3 Ordinarily, we review an award of sanctions for abuse of discretion.  Lazorko v. 
Pa. Hosp., 237 F.3d 242, 248 (3d Cir. 2000).  Because Haagensen challenges only 
the District Court’s jurisdiction to award the sanctions, and not the decision to 
assess the sanctions or the amount, our review is de novo.  See Great W. Mining & 
Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2010).  Inasmuch 
as the order awarded sanctions in a specific amount, it is a final order, and we 
exercise appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Lazorko, 237 F.3d at 248. 
5 
 
court judgment.  See Exxon-Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus., 544 U.S. 280, 284 
(2005).  Rooker-Feldman’s application, however, is limited to those cases “brought 
by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments 
rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district 
court review and rejections of those judgments.”  Id.  Thus, Rooker-Feldman does 
not apply “simply because a party attempts to litigate in federal court a matter 
previously litigated in state court.”  Id. at 293.  As a result, courts must scrutinize a 
plaintiff’s federal complaint to determine if the claim at issue is barred by Rooker-
Feldman or is viable because it is actually “an independent, non-barred claim.”  
Great W. Mining & Mineral, 615 F.3d at 166.   
 Having determined that Haagensen’s claim against the neighbor defendants 
complained of an injury from the state court judgment in the quiet title action, the 
District Court properly ended its analysis of the merits of her § 1983 claim at that 
point under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.4  Haagensen, 610 F. App’x at 211.  
Although barred from reviewing the merits of that claim, see Exxon-Mobil Corp., 
544 U.S. at 284, the District Court appropriately exercised its federal question 
jurisdiction over Haagensen’s other § 1983 claims against the tax entities and 
                                         
4 One of the neighbor defendants was Edward W. Abersold.  According to a 
suggestion of death, Abersold died on July 13, 2016 and no estate has yet to be 
opened.  Under all the circumstances, Haagensen’s motion for substitution is 
denied.  Furthermore, because we will affirm the order granting the motion for 
sanctions, the motion to amend the caption is moot.  Haagensen’s other motions 
are denied.   
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managed other matters separate and distinct from the merits of the claim barred by 
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, such as the neighbor defendants’ motion for 
sanctions.  In light of Haagensen’s appeal, the District Court permissibly denied 
the motion for sanctions without prejudice, thereby allowing the neighbor 
defendants to renew their request following the conclusion of the appeal.  See Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B), (E) (providing that, when the sanctions requested are 
neither for violation of the rules or under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, a court order may 
establish when a motion for attorney’s fees may be filed). 
 Our mandate affirming the District Court’s judgment on the first appeal 
returned the case to the District Court for whatever additional proceedings were 
appropriate or necessary.  See Ostrer v. United States, 584 F.2d 594, 598 (2d Cir. 
1978) (“The effect of the mandate is to bring the proceedings in a case on appeal in 
our Court to a close and to remove it from the jurisdiction of this Court, returning it 
to the forum whence it came.”).  In the absence of a renewed motion for sanctions, 
the District Court’s action would have been to close the civil action in accordance 
with the mandate as there was nothing more for the court to do.  The renewed 
motion for sanctions, however, raised an issue that the District Court was 
authorized to resolve.  We conclude that the District Court had the authority under 
§ 1331 to resolve this motion for sanctions.  See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 
131, 138 (1992) (reiterating that “‘[i]t is well established that a federal court may 
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consider collateral issues after an action is no longer pending’ . . .[and] therefore 
does not raise the issue of a district court adjudicating the merits of a ‘case or 
controversy’ over which it lacks jurisdiction”) (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx 
Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395 (1990); Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 396 (concluding that 
“the imposition of a Rule 11 sanction is not a judgment on the merits of the action” 
and that it “require[d] the determination of a collateral issue: whether the attorney 
has abused the judicial process,” which “may be made after the principal suit has 
been terminated”).  For that reason, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
